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Reconciling the Right to Food and Trade 
Liberalization: Developing Country 
Opportunities 
Lily Endean Nierenberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In late summer 2010, two nations, Brazil and Kenya, 
inserted the human right to food into their national law. 
Brazil’s Constitution1 and its Policy of Food Security and 
Nutrition2 and Kenya’s new Constitution3 impose a legal duty 
on each state that had previously existed only as a moral duty 
in the international human rights regime.4 In both cases, the 
domestic law creates an accountability mechanism by which 
citizens can challenge their governments for failing to fulfill 
this new legal obligation.  
Although these two countries adopted right to food laws, it 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007, Vassar 
College. Thanks to Gregory Shaffer, Joseph Nierenberg, and the editorial staff 
of the Journal, especially Aaron Kreuter and Kalli Bennett, for their 
contributions to this Note’s development. 
 1. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] ch. II, art. 6 (Braz.). See 
also The Right to Food Is Now in the Constitution of Brazil, RIGHT TO FOOD 
(Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.fao.org/righttofood/news39_en.htm.  
 2. Decreto No. 7.272, de 25 de Agosto de 2010, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 26.8.2010 (Braz.). See also Brazil Adopts a New Policy on Food 
Security and Nutrition, RIGHT TO FOOD (Sept. 2, 2010), 
http://www.fao.org/righttofood/news43_en.htm. 
 3. CONSTITUTION, art. 43 (2010) (Kenya). See also The Republic of Kenya 
Recognizes the Right to Food in the New Constitution, RIGHT TO FOOD (Aug. 
31, 2010), http://www.fao.org/righttofood/news42_en.htm. 
 4. Both are state parties to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which implies that states have a duty to 
ensure adequate food and to keep their people free from hunger. See 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11, 
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976). See also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Vi
ewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2011) (listing the signatories).  
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is uncertain whether they can fulfill their obligations by 
enacting the necessary domestic policies, given the existing 
dictates of the international trade regime.5 The goal of this 
Note is to critically examine this tension between the domestic 
right to food and international trade law and, in doing so, to 
add analytical rigor to the scholarship on trade liberalization as 
it corresponds to human rights.6 This Note concludes that the 
human right to food may be reconciled with international trade 
law through developing country actions, including protectionist 
measures and international collaboration defended on the basis 
of the domestic right to food.  
First, it will briefly summarize the history of agricultural 
liberalization and the development of the international human 
right to food. Next, the inquiry will turn to the prevalence and 
the features of the domestic right to food. The final section of 
Part I will critically examine the argument that developed 
countries are obligated to protect citizens of other states.  
Part II will begin by providing a general summary of 
countries’ existing obligations—and opportunities—under 
international trade agreements in agriculture. Next, it will 
discuss the potential for international dispute resolution 
forums to incorporate domestic right to food justifications in 
determining whether or not a trade violation has occurred. It 
will do so by examining two instances in which there is the 
potential for such occurrence: disputes within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and international arbitrations. Finally, as 
an alternative to unilateral action, this Note will identify 
potential loci for international cooperation between developing 
countries that have adopted the right to food in two areas: 
 
 5. For a thoughtful assessment of this problem, see generally Chris 
Downes, Must the Losers of Free Trade Go Hungry? Reconciling WTO 
Obligations and the Right to Food, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 619 (2007); Christine 
Kaufmann & Simone Heri, Liberalizing Trade in Agriculture and Food 
Security—Mission Impossible?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1039 (2007). 
 6. See Philip Alston, Remarks on Professor B.S. Chimni’s A Just World 
Under Law: A View from the South, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 221, 229–30 (2007) 
(“Unfortunately, too many of the analyses of global economic issues 
undertaken by human rights proponents lack analytical rigor, are 
economically illiterate, and are ultimately unpersuasive except to the human 
rights faithful. It is essential that we acknowledge the complexity of the 
challenge of working out ways in which human rights might be relevant to—
let alone transcend or trump—the principles underpinning international 
regimes such as those dealing with trade, finance, or investment. The real 
world policy consequences of an appropriate insistence upon giving priority to 
human rights considerations require careful, informed, systematic, and 
balanced analysis.”). 
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special treatment for seeds under the WTO’s Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and 
coordinated competition laws. 
A. AGRICULTURAL LIBERALIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHT TO FOOD 
Global statistics on food insecurity elucidate what is at 
stake in the academic discussion on the right to food and 
international trade. According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, roughly 925 million 
persons worldwide suffered from food insecurity in 2010.7 
Another statistic puts that number above one billion.8 The 
majority of those are, ironically, food producers.9 The remaining 
groups of food insecure persons live in urban areas10 or are 
victims of disaster.11 These statistics reveal a history of 
agricultural restructuring that has negatively impacted 
farmers.12 
 
 7. FAQs on Hunger, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/hunger/faqs-on-hunger/en (last visited Nov. 17, 2010). Food 
insecurity is interchangeably referred to as hunger in the literature. However, 
it is this author’s view that the term “hunger” connotes an emergency 
situation that must be solved in the short term, whereas “food insecurity” 
connotes a structural problem that should be addressed sustainably. 
Therefore, the term “food insecurity” is more apt for the present discussion. 
 8. Smita Narula, Reclaiming the Right to Food as a Normative Response 
to the Global Food Crisis, 13 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 403, 403 (2010) (citing a 
projection of the FAO for 2009). 
 9. This includes farmers who own their land, farm laborers, fisherfolk, 
and both subsistence and cash crop farmers. FAQs on Hunger, supra note 7. 
 10. Id. Urban migration often occurs as a result of rural economic 
pressures. However, a solution to food insecurity might not be the same for 
urban dwellers, for the obvious reason that they do not have access to the 
means of production without moving to rural areas. While this Note examines 
the right to food from the standpoint of rural farmers, an interesting next 
question to examine is what the consequences of domestic policies will be for 
the urban poor. 
 11. Id. It has been suggested that international humanitarian law arises 
from the same universal framework as trade and human rights, and, as such, 
should be integrated with these areas to form a comprehensive international 
approach to food. For a discussion of this position, see generally Donald E. 
Buckingham, A Recipe for Change: Towards an Integrated Approach to Food 
Under International Law, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 285 (1994).  
 12. See, e.g., Wenonah Hauter, The Limits of International Human Rights 
Law and the Role of Food Sovereignty in Protecting People from Further Trade 
Liberalization under the Doha Round Negotiations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1071, 1080 (2007) (summarizing the results of two long-term surveys and 
noting the widespread negative effects on farmers from liberalization of 
agriculture); Alexandra Spieldoch, NAFTA: Fueling Market Concentration in 
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Following the debt crisis of the 1980’s, countries with 
developing economies rapidly transitioned to industrial and 
export-based agriculture.13 During that time, the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF)14 encouraged 
governments to pursue trade liberalization in agriculture by 
conditioning loans on the reduction of trade barriers and 
government support for agriculture.15 The General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (now the WTO) further 
encouraged developing countries to lower the barriers to their 
markets.16 These institutions considered that liberalization 
would result in net efficiency gains—a positive development 
viewed in the aggregate and from the point of view of 
consumers—because the net result is to lower the cost of food. 
To some extent, industrial nations have seen gains in terms of 
overall economic growth, a greater variety of foods at lower 
cost, and individuals’ freedom to seek employment in other 
industries.17  
 
Agriculture, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY (Mar. 2010), 
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?accountID=451&refID=107275 
(discussing NAFTA’s impact on small farmers and rural communities). See 
generally Mark Ritchie & Kristin Dawkins, WTO Food and Agricultural Rules: 
Sustainable Agriculture and the Human Right to Food, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 9 (2000) (exploring the impact of export dumping by agricultural 
corporations on agriculture and food security). 
 13. For a history of liberalization in India leading to food insecurity, see 
Sukanya Pillay, India Sinking: Threats to the Right to Food, Food Security & 
Development in an Era of Economic Growth, 27 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 
127 (2009) (discussing, inter alia, the reasons for India’s food insecurity rates, 
pointing to the neoliberal development model encouraged by the IMF and 
World Bank and the liberalized agricultural reforms of the Green Revolution). 
For a discussion of food security in the context of Mexico’s history of 
agricultural liberalization, see Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, 
and Malnutrition: Agricultural Trade Policy through an Environmental 
Justice Lens, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 345 (2006). 
 14. This Note doesn’t address the IMF or World Bank because these 
institutions are peripheral to the international trade regime, strictly speaking. 
The obligations of countries to the IMF or World Bank do not exist as treaties 
or as international customary law. 
 15. See Narula, supra note 8, at 408; Michael Windfuhr, The Agreement 
on Agriculture of the WTO and the Right to Food, FOODFIRST INFO. & ACTION 
NETWORK (Sept. 2003), http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/agree
ment-on-agriculture-of-the-wto-and-the-right-to-food/pdf; These loan 
conditionalities are referred to as structural adjustment policies. Narula, 
supra note 8, at 408. For a more in depth history of the effects of these 
institutions on developing economies, see generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2003). 
 16. Narula, supra note 8 at 409–10. 
 17. Sophia Murphy, Concentrated Market Power and Agricultural Trade, 
ECOFAIR TRADE DIALOGUE DISCUSSION PAPERS NO. 1 (Heinrich Böll Found., 
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The corollary is that trade liberalization of agriculture 
pushes peasants off the land and into cities,18 or for those who 
stay it results in an economically difficult—if not impossible19—
situation.20 Behind this reality is an economic relationship 
between farmers and transnational corporations (TNCs). TNCs 
have a heavy impact on the food system in developing 
countries, including what food is selected for production, how it 
is produced, and the cost at which food is produced.21 Because 
of their market power, TNCs are able to charge high prices for 
agricultural inputs while commodity buyers push the selling 
prices of crops downward.22 This lack of purchasing power 
caused by the disparity between the selling price of farmers’ 
raw goods (called the “farmgate price”) and the price of local or 
imported food23 is the immediate cause of food insecurity. The 
state is called upon to meet the needs of these food insecure 
individuals through the provision of food aid.24  
Thus, hunger and malnutrition are ultimately caused by a 
lack of access to food and not an inadequate global food 
supply.25 Peasants have responded by creating a transnational 
 
Berlin), Aug. 21, 2006, at 21, available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/libr
ary.cfm?RefID=89014.  
 18. See Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 346–47. 
 19. For instance, over 17,000 Indian farmers committed suicide in 2003 as 
a result of the psychological and economic pressures of agricultural 
restructuring. Steve Suppan, Challenges for Food Sovereignty, 32 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 111, 116 (2008). See also George Lerner, Activist: Farmer Suicides 
in India linked to Debt, Globalization, CNN (Jan. 6, 2010), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/01/05/india.farmer.suicides/. 
 20. See UN Rapporteur and WTO Head Debate the Impact of Trade on 
Hunger, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/debates_e/debate14_sum
mary_e.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (“‘Prices are too high for consumers at 
the end of the chain, but are still too low and not sufficiently profitable for 
small farmers, who cannot really earn a living from their crops,’ Dr De 
Schuter [sic] said. ‘This is where the food crisis is. It is small farmers driven 
towards the cities, unable to live off their fields, relegated to subsistence 
farming because prices are not sufficiently profitable.’”). 
 21. Narula, supra note 8, at 410. 
 22. Id. at 411. 
 23. Murphy, supra note 17, at 25. While, ideally, trade liberalization 
would lead to lower commodity prices and, thus, cheaper food for consumers, 
this has not been the case in many developing countries that rely increasingly 
on imported food. Id. Simultaneously, farmers are charged higher prices for 
inputs such as seeds and fertilizers. Id. at 24. 
 24. Food assistance can thus be viewed as a necessity arising out of the 
logic of free trade. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 201–02 (2d ed. 2003). 
 25. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 12: Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
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peasant movement for agricultural policy change.26 At the 
World Social Forum in 1996, Via Campesina, a collective of 
peasant organizations, raised a slogan of food sovereignty that 
stands in marked contrast to agricultural liberalization.27 In 
fact, one of the main slogans of the food sovereignty movement 
is “WTO Out of Agriculture!”28 Also, at the World Social Forum, 
member countries called for a clearer definition of the nascent 
international human right to food.29  
The human right to food is enshrined in a host of 
international agreements. Article 25 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is considered the first 
articulation of the right to food in an international legal 
instrument.30 It was adopted as part of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),31 
a group of rights that have been criticized as deeply socialistic 
and have yet to be adopted by the United States.32 Article 11 of 
the ICESCR and General Comment 12 by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights together contain the most 
detailed and widely accepted articulation of the right to food.33 
 
E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) [hereinafter General Comment 12].  
 26. See Suppan, supra note 19, at 111. 
 27. Id. The goals of food sovereignty announced at that time were the 
right to food; genuine agrarian reform; protecting natural resources; 
reorganizing trade in food; controlling globalization; social peace, and 
democratic control of the food system. Sadie Beauregard, Food Policy for 
People: Incorporating Food Sovereignty Principles into State Governance, 10–
11 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished senior comprehensive), 
http://departments.oxy.edu/uepi/uep/studentwork/09comps/Food%20Policy%20
for%20People.pdf. 
 28. Suppan, supra note 19, at 113. 
 29. General Comment 12, supra note 25, ¶ 2. See also Olivier De Schutter, 
Countries Tackling Hunger with a Right to Food Approach, BRIEFING NOTE 1, 
May 2010, at 2. 
 30. See, e.g., De Shutter, supra note 29, at 4; Narula, supra note 8, at 404. 
Cf. George Kent, The Human Right to Food and Dignity, 37 HUM. RTS. 1, at 3 
(2010) (noting that the human right to adequate food was stated as early as 
1963 at the Special Assembly on Man’s Right to Freedom from Hunger); 
Anthony Paul Kearns, III, Note, The Right to Food Exists Via Customary 
International Law, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 223, 225–26 (1998) 
(noting the presence of a right to food in historical treaties and constitutions). 
 31. ICESCR, art. 11, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
 32. Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (1990). 
 33. The right to food also appears in regional human rights instruments. 
See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article XI, O.A.S. 
Res. XXX (May 2, 1948) (“Every person has the right to the preservation of his 
health through sanitary and social measures relating to food, clothing, 
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General Comment 12, a response to the request for clarity at 
the World Social Forum,34 declares the core content of the right 
to food to be: “The availability of food in a quantity and quality 
sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from 
adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture; The 
accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that 
do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights.”35  
In effect, the CESCR imposes an obligation on parties to 
respect, protect, and fulfill—which in turn means to facilitate 
and provide—the right to food of their citizens under the above 
definition.36 Like other economic, social and cultural rights, the 
right to food is meant to be realized progressively.37 In sum, the 
right to food is an economic, social, and cultural right38 that is a 
duty borne by states to individual citizens.39 Countries have 
adopted a domestic right to food modeled after the 
international human right.  
B. THE DEVELOPING DOMESTIC RIGHT TO FOOD 
A domestic right to food is fundamental to the success of 
the international human right because it allows citizens to 
 
housing and medical care, to the extent permitted by public and community 
resources.”). 
 34. General Comment 12, supra note 25, ¶ 2. 
 35. Id. ¶ 8. 
 36. Id. ¶ 15. See also Kent, supra note 30, at 4 (“Respect means to do no 
harm to others. Protect means to prevent harm to others by third parties. 
Facilitate means to help others to meet their own needs. Provide means to 
meet others’ needs when they cannot do that themselves.”).  
 37. General Comment 12, supra note 25, ¶ 14. 
 38.  For a general introduction to economic, social, and cultural rights, see 
DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 97–105 (4th ed. 
2009). 
 39. For a discussion of individual versus group rights in the human rights 
context, see DONNELLY, supra note 24, at 204–24. There is a developing view 
that indigenous groups have collective rights, including the right to food. See, 
e.g., id. at 215 (granting that indigenous groups may not be subject to the 
general critique of group rights because the best legal mechanism to protect 
them from external pressures may be group rights to self-government and 
restrictions on non-members). For a discussion specific to the group right to 
food and indigenous groups, see Lidija Knuth, The Right to Adequate Food and 
Indigenous Peoples, RIGHT TO FOOD STUDIES (Food & Agric. Org. United 
Nations, Rome), 2009, available at www.fao.org/righttofood. Cf. Jan 
Kratochvil, Realizing a Promise: A Case for Ratification of the Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 HUM. 
RTS. BRIEF 30, 31 (2009) (noting the fact that the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights allows individual, but 
not collective, complaints).  
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challenge human rights violations of their governments.40 In 
order to understand why this is, it is important to emphasize 
the unique nature of international human rights. One of the 
major distinctions between international and domestic rights is 
the likelihood of enforcement, with domestic rights having the 
higher likelihood.41 Another is the uniquely moral character of 
human rights, which theoretically push states to a higher 
standard of behavior, but do not necessarily translate into 
action.42 As mentioned above, some governments, including 
most recently Brazil and Kenya, recognize a legally enforceable 
right to food in their domestic law, which addresses these 
shortcomings.  
In Brazil, the right to food was established with a 
constitutional amendment in February 2010,43 following the 
adoption, in 2006, of the National Food and Nutritional 
Security Framework Law.44 In August, 2010, the constitutional 
amendment was followed by the adoption of a Policy on Food 
Security and Nutrition, firmly anchoring the right to food 
 
 40. National implementation is generally the goal of international moral 
obligations which are, by their nature, less often legally enforceable than 
domestic legal obligations. See DONNELLY, supra note 24, at 179–80; see also 
Alston, supra note 6, at 233–34 (noting that the most important actions for 
human rights remain at the national level). The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has created a set of Voluntary 
Guidelines to help states enact and implement the right to food into their 
domestic law. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to 
Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (2005), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/y9825e/y9825e00.htm. 
 41. See DONNELLY, supra note 24, at 173–75 (noting that the “nonjudicial 
and noncoercive aspects of IHR [international human rights] are those that 
produce the greatest impact”—e.g. country reporting and complaint 
procedures—but that human rights obligations are generally implemented 
through voluntary national action, the dimensions of which are understudied). 
 42. See id. at 14–15 (stating that the source of human rights is human 
morality); see also id. at 136–37 (asserting that human rights regimes reflect 
moral interdependence at the international level, but states and individuals 
are resistant to converting that into action at the international level); Kent, 
supra note 30, at 2–3 (describing the moral source of rights and the fact that 
human rights have a universal dignity component and a local component, 
ideally). Cf. Andras Sajo, Socioeconomic Rights and the International 
Economic Order, 35 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 226–27 (2002) (noting that 
human rights do not derive from a sense of morality, but rather an obligation 
of realization, which derives from a sense of international cooperation). 
 43. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] ch. II, art. 6 (Braz.). 
 44. Lei No. 11.346, de 15 de Setembro de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 18.9.2006 (Braz.). See also The Right to Food Is Now in the 
Constitution of Brazil, supra note 1. 
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under Brazilian law.45 This law charges administrators in the 
Federal Executive responsible for implementing programs of 
the Policy of Food Security and Nutrition with 
“establishing . . . mechanisms and instruments of 
accountability. . . .”46  
Likewise, the President of Kenya signed a new 
Constitution into effect in 2010,47 which includes the right to 
food as a reflection of its international obligations under the 
CESCR.48 In Kenya, the new Constitution allows for various 
types of claim mechanisms in the case that the state or state 
organs violate the right to food.49 Thus, with these claim 
mechanisms in place in both Brazil and Kenya, a citizen can 
hold his government responsible for failing to respect, protect, 
promote or provide his right to food.50 
By the end of 2010, twenty-five countries had the right to 
food in their Constitutions.51 In addition, national policies (or 
“framework laws”) provide for the accountability of government 
officials, prioritize the right to food in development strategies 
and establish a nation’s bargaining position in trade and 
investment.52 Ideally, these laws are translations of the 
 
 45. Decreto No. 7.272, de 25 de Agosto de 2010, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 26.8.2010 (Braz.). See also Brazil Adopts a New Policy on Food 
Security and Nutrition, supra note 2. 
 46. See Decreto No. 7.272, de 25 de Agosto de 2010, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 26.8.2010 (Braz.). 
 47. CONSTITUTION, art. 43 (2010) (Kenya). See also The Republic of Kenya 
Recognizes the Right to Food in the New Constitution, supra note 3 (noting and 
citing Kenya’s adoption of a Constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to 
food). 
 48. See The Republic of Kenya Recognizes the Right to Food in the New 
Constitution, supra note 3. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Of course, a domestic court may not necessarily use the same test to 
interpret liability under domestic laws as international laws, though doing so 
is encouraged by the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. See 
General Comment 12, supra note 25, ¶ 29. 
 51. De Schutter, supra note 29, at 5 (noting twenty-four countries have 
included the right to food in their Constitution). The twenty-fifth government 
was Kenya. See CONSTITUTION, art. 43 (2010) (Kenya); see also The Republic of 
Kenya Recognizes the Right to Food in the New Constitution, supra note 3. In 
the context of water, one Note argues that positive rights specifying the 
content of the right in law, as opposed to an umbrella right such as the right to 
life, are more effective and democratic. Note, What Price for the Priceless?: 
Implementing the Justiciability of the Right to Water, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1067 
(2007) [hereinafter What Price for the Priceless?]. 
 52. De Schutter, supra note 29, at 5–6. 
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ICESCR into domestic laws.53 Additionally, national strategies 
such as Brazil’s Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) Strategy and India’s 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act are another 
important step toward implementing the right to food.54  
Effective remedies are essential to the national 
implementation of the right to food.55 National courts are 
encouraged to follow the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ interpretation of the right to food, as laid out 
in General Comment 12.56 Some countries, such as Argentina, 
allow direct claims under the ICESCR to be brought in 
domestic courts.57 There have been successful challenges of a 
government’s violation of the right to food in the domestic 
courts of a number of countries, including India and Nepal.58 In 
India, the Supreme Court interpreted the right to food as a 
justiciable Constitutional right in People’s Union for Civil 
Liberties v. Union of India & Others.59 The Indian Supreme 
Court’s opinion was cited in a subsequent right to food 
challenge brought before the Nepalese Supreme Court,60 which 
was also considered a victory by human rights advocates.61 
One interesting question is what to do if there is no 
accountability mechanism in place to make the government 
accountable if it fails to honor its commitment to the right to 
food. If there is no accountability mechanism domestically,62 
 
 53. Id. at 6; see also General Comment 12, supra note 25, ¶ 29.  
 54. De Schutter, supra note 29, at 7–9. See also General Comment 12, 
supra note 25, ¶ 21. 
 55. See General Comment 12, supra note 25, ¶ 32. 
 56. Id. ¶ 33. 
 57. Hauter, supra note 12, at 1089. 
 58. De Schutter, supra note 29, at 10–12. See also id. at 10, 15 n. 18 
(citing cases from Argentina, Colombia, Switzerland, and Paraguay, where the 
claimant alleged a violation of their right to food). 
 59. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Others (PUCL), 
(2001) (India), available at http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm
?doc_id=401033. See also Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, Between 
Starvation and Globalization: Realizing the Right to Food in India, 31 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 691 (2010) (detailing recent developments in the domestic law and 
policy on the right to food in India, which are primarily focused on food 
assistance entitlements).  
 60. De Schutter, supra note 29, at 11, 15 n.21. 
 61. See Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 59, at 764 (noting that the PUCL 
case in India sparked litigation in neighboring countries, such as Nepal, and 
discussing that such success could translate into judicial actions elsewhere in 
the world); see also De Schutter, supra note 29, at 11. For more information on 
domestic right to food litigation, see id. at 10–12. 
 62. India is an example of a country where the enforceability mechanism 
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then any judicial challenges must be made at the regional63 or 
international level. There is an academic trend to make 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights justiciable at an 
international, or supranational, level.64 However, for now the 
reality appears to be that international and regional tribunals 
are hesitant to adjudicate economic, social, and cultural rights 
outside of states’ duty to protect.65 Yet a hopeful sign for 
justiciability promoters occurred in December, 2008, when the 
UN General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights.66 However, the effect of the Optional Protocol is not 
likely to be higher enforcement rates;67 thus domestic 
adjudication remains vitally important. 
In a contrary fashion, recent scholarship that has 
examined the tension between the right to food and 
international trade has generally focused on the obligation of 
developed countries, such as the United States, to protect the 
rights of citizens of other states.68 
 
for the right to food was read broadly by the courts as falling under the Indian 
Constitution. Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 59, at 699–700. 
 63. Three regional human rights systems recognize the right to food. See 
Hauter, supra note 12, at 1090. For example, the right to food is made explicit 
in the Additional Protocol of the American Convention on Human Rights in 
the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), 
adopted in 1998. However, due to the lack of enforceability and procedural 
difficulty of adjudicating cases in these regional systems, only a few violations 
of the right to food have been redressed using these bodies. Id. at 1090.  
 64. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic 
Rights Through Supranational Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53 (2006) 
(proposing supranational justice for social, economic, and cultural rights 
violations in order to demonstrate their equality with civil and political rights, 
and the use of the international criminal court for gross violations on the order 
of crimes against humanity); What Price for the Priceless?, supra note 51 
(noting that adjudicating positive responsibilities of states over their social, 
economic, and cultural rights obligation would assure the highest degree of 
protection).  
 65. See generally Marcus, supra note 64. 
 66. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 
2008). 
 67. Kratochvil, supra note 39, at 34 (noting that “[t]he rationale of the 
Protocol is not enforcement, but rather more subtle kinds of implementation 
like highlighting, mainstreaming and assisting the governments to identify 
with more precision their obligations under the Covenant.”) 
 68. See, e.g., Narula, supra note 8; see also Smita Narula, The Right to 
Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691 (2006). 
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C. THE MISPLACED FOCUS ON DEVELOPED COUNTRIES’ 
OBLIGATIONS AND ACTIONS 
Scholars have explored what actions the United States 
should take, were it obligated to act under the international 
right to food.69 For instance, Narula suggests a number of 
solutions that stem from powerful states’ obligations to respect 
and protect, as embodied in human rights instruments such as 
the CESCR.70 She ultimately concludes that powerful states, as 
members of international financial institutions (IFIs) such as 
the World Bank and IMF, should encourage institutional 
policies that are closely tailored to an individual country’s 
needs, rather than using a one-size-fits-all model.71 In the 
context of the WTO, she suggests that powerful states could 
support policies that “truly level the playing field.”72 Finally, 
with regard to TNCs, she advocates for powerful states to enact 
legislation with an extraterritorial reach and to extend their 
antitrust legislation to address the buying power of TNCs.73  
Narula, however, doesn’t address the fact that the United 
States is not a party to the CESCR, and therefore is not 
bound—even under her analysis—to respect or protect the 
rights of global citizens.74 In any event, as a limitation on 
extraterritorial action by third parties, the CESCR requires the 
nations’ free consent to international cooperation.75 This offers 
developing states protection against potentially neo-colonial 
intervention by powerful states, but it also thereby limits the 
effectiveness of calling for powerful states to act in relation to 
their obligations under the CESCR.76 
Theoretically, the United States may be obligated through 
 
 69. Narula, supra note 8, at 414. (“The existing human rights legal 
framework is ill-equipped to deal with these actors and the effects of their 
policies abroad: it limits states’ obligations to respecting, protecting, and 
fulfilling the rights of individuals in their territory or under their jurisdiction, 
and it does not directly address the obligations of IFIs and TNCs.”). While this 
note does not address IFIs, TNCs play a central role, as well as the policies of 
the WTO.  
 70. Narula, supra note 8, at 408.  
 71. Id. at 417. 
 72. Id. at 417–18. 
 73. Id. at 418–19. 
 74. Peter Straub, Farmers in the IP Wrench—How Patents on Gene-
modified Crops Violate the Right to Food in Developing Countries, 29 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 211 (2006). 
 75. Sajo, supra note 42, at 226–27. 
 76. Id. 
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customary international law on the right to food,77 which one 
scholar believes has achieved the status of jus cogens.78 
However, the United States has been careful to deny any legal 
obligations arising from international law or its involvement in 
the realm of food aid,79 and may therefore be a persistent 
objector.80 There is, however, a consensus among development 
economists and policy makers in the United States that trade 
and the right to food are consistent, if not mutually reinforcing, 
and therefore that the agricultural export model and food aid 
are sufficient to satisfy any moral obligation that Americans 
may have toward other citizens of the world.  
The behavior of TNCs presents a different type of obstacle 
to the human right to food because states—not corporations—
bear the primary obligation to citizens under international 
law.81 And while there have been international efforts to draft 
and impose non-voluntary norms of responsibility on 
transnational corporate actors,82 such efforts have proven 
ultimately unsuccessful.83 Corporate behavior is affected only 
 
 77. Compare Laura Niada, Hunger and International Law: The Far-
Reaching Scope of the Human Right to Food, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 131 (2006) 
(recognizing a customary international norm, possibly jus cogens), and Henry 
J. Richardson, III, The Right to Food: The International Perspective, 30 HOW. 
L.J. 223, 233 (1987) (claiming that an interpretation of Article 11(b) of the 
CESCR and the established expectations of international food support 
programs give rise to a duty). 
 78. Kearns, III, supra note 29. One scholar has argued that the United 
States’ pledge of food aid has resulted in a duty to rescue under a common law 
understanding of that obligation. Dinah Shelton, The Duty to Assist Famine 
Victims, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1309 (1985).  
 79. See Explanation of Position by Craig Kuehl, United States Advisor, on 
Resolution L.30, Rev. 1—The Right to Food, in the Third Committee of the 
Sixty-fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, States News 
Service (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/
2009/132187.htm.  
 80. J.M. Greene, Localization: Implementing the Right to Food, 14 DRAKE 
J. AGRIC. L. 377, 382 (2009) (noting that, even under customary international 
law, the United States may be exempt as a persistent objector from the right 
to food). 
 81. See, e.g., Narula, supra note 68, at 724; see also Emeka Duruigbo, 
Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human Rights 
Abuses, 6 NW. U.J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 222 (2008) (reviewing changes in the 
recognition of TNC’s within the international legal system, human rights in 
particular). 
 82. See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 (2003). 
 83. See Duruigbo, supra note 81, at 243–47 (discussing the conclusions of 
the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on the issue of Human Rights 
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indirectly through human rights treaties.84 There may be a 
changing view of human rights bodies toward state 
accountability for non-state actors that violate human rights 
law, specifically that the state’s duty to protect citizens extends 
to regulating TNCs in its jurisdictions.85 However, because the 
examples from the human rights courts and commissions 
primarily concern developing countries’ accountability to their 
citizens,86 it is uncertain how strong an effect this will have in 
terms of action that TNCs’ home states—such as the United 
States—must take.  
The following pages will look at a host state’s actions and 
obligations. It is important to look at this issue from the 
perspective of states that have enacted domestic right to food 
laws, because it can illuminate whether developing countries’ 
implementation of the right to food at the national level is 
ultimately an effective human rights goal. This should not be 
read as a critique of home state actions, but rather an 
opportunity to analyze the agency of the countries that have 
already assumed human rights obligations. 
II. ANALYSIS: DEVELOPING COUNTRY OPPORTUNITIES 
The argument of this Note is not against the principles of 
trade or trade agreements—which are defensible from the 
perspective of economic study. Rather, the critical inquiry is 
upon the idea that trade and the human right to food cannot 
coexist. While there is a coalesced point of view within the 
human rights community that the reality of free trade and the 
 
and Transnational Crporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, 
on the norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with regard to human rights, ultimately finding little 
change in the position of TNCs in international law). Cf. David Graham & 
Ngaire Woods, Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing 
Countries, 34 World Development 868 (2006) (noting that limited economic 
control or unwillingness to regulate are traditional problems with regulation 
of corporations by the developing, i.e. host, countries, and suggesting less 
direct regulations that could effectively result in voluntary corporate adoption 
of higher standards due to pressures from civil society).  
 84. Corporations are not generally considered subject to international 
human rights law. See Duruigbo, supra note 81; see also Analia Marsella 
Sende, The Responsibilities of States for Actions of Transnational Corporations 
Affecting Social and Economic Rights: A Comparative Analysis of the Duty to 
Protect, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 33 (2009) (indicating the importance of 
extraterritorial control by the home state). 
 85. Sende, supra note 84.  
 86. Id.  
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right to food are fundamentally in conflict,87 scholarship 
suggests that there is no inherent inconsistency between trade 
and human rights, but rather there is an implementation gap. 
For instance, contrary to what the parties have agreed to, 
seldom do they perform or eliminate trade liberalization 
agreements.88 To make matters worse, trade agreements 
continue to be enforced while human rights obligations often go 
unenforced.89 This Note thus proceeds under the assumption 
that, while trade obligations may be theoretically consistent 
with human rights, they are not optimal from a human rights 
perspective. This section will look at whether developing states 
are able to craft law and policy to ensure the right to food for 
their citizens given their existing trade obligations. 
A. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES COULD ENACT TRADE PROTECTIONS 
UNDER EXISTING LAW 
Proponents of the right to food often support protectionist 
measures that are assumed to be illegal under the WTO, thus 
raising the question of whether the WTO and human rights are 
reconcilable.90 The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Olivier de Schutter, has called for trade bodies to review their 
policies to ensure that countries have adequate “policy space”—
that is, the freedom to enact political change—to fulfill their 
obligations.91 In other words, countries should be legally 
 
 87. See Human Rights Council Holds Panel Discussion on Realization of 
Right to Food, STATES NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 9, 2009). They argue that the 
underlying causes of food insecurity are the trade liberalization policies of the 
WTO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—that 
support an industrial and export model of agriculture—and the further 
marginalization of farmers by TNCs. Id. 
 88. See generally Ritchie & Dawkins, supra note 12 (making strong 
recommendations about reforms in the WTO that would reconcile trade with 
sustainable agriculture and the right to food, including global anti-trust 
measures).  
 89. Lamy: Trade and Human Rights Go Hand in Hand, STATES NEWS 
SERVICE (Sept. 30, 2010). See also Straub, supra note 74 (discussing the 
conflicting human rights and trade obligations on states with respect to 
Intellectual Property in seeds, and concluding that without enforcement of a 
“hard” human rights norm, states are more likely to resolve conflict on the side 
of trade obligations). 
 90. See, e.g., Kaufmann & Heri, supra note 5 (surmising that states’ 
obligations under WTO rules and their human rights commitments are 
reconcilable, but concluding that legal reconciliation is insufficient to overcome 
food insecurity).  
 91. See WTO: Trade Negotiations Need to Reflect New Global Consensus 
on Hunger, Warns UN Expert on Right to Food, States News Service (Dec. 2, 
2009); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De 
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allowed to choose policies that best achieve the right to food of 
their citizens.92 Scholars have argued that certain policies best 
achieve the human right to food.93 For instance, human rights 
objectives may be optimized by allowing greater protectionism 
by developing states and restricting trade-distorting behavior 
by developed states.94 An appropriate starting place is to look 
at the options that are currently available under the WTO 
framework.  
States, by acceding to trade agreements, are obligated to 
act according to the dictates of the international trade regime.95 
With respect to food, this includes, inter alia, agreements 
between member states of the WTO, such as the Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA).96 Obligations under the WTO generally 
require states to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, 
eliminate state support and subsidies for certain industries, 
and not discriminate against foreign ownership.97 The AoA 
 
Schutter (presented to the Human Rights Council, Mar. 9, 2009) 1, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Summary_of%20report%20of%20the%20Sp
ecial%20Rapporteur%20on%20the%20right%20to%20food.pdf. 
 92. Karen Kong, The Right to Food for All: A Right-Based Approach to 
Hunger and Social Inequality, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 525 (2009) 
(promoting an expansive concept of equality, which relies on Amartya Sen’s 
concept of development as freedom, as a method for interpreting the legal 
obligations of states with regard to the right to food).  
 93. Kent, supra note 30 (asserting the primacy of locally-based and 
dignified solutions within the human right paradigm: people can and should 
be allowed to feed themselves). Cf. Hauter, supra note 12 (suggesting Food 
Sovereignty as an ideal, policy-based solution to food insecurity in light of the 
slow progress and jurisdictionally-limited nature of the right to food 
enforcement). See also Greene, supra note 80 (suggesting changes in United 
States domestic and foreign food policy that would better achieve food security 
by strengthening local food systems at home and abroad).  
 94. Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 373 (recommending an asymmetrical 
trade policy that allows developing countries to implement protectionist 
measures and requires developed countries to remove all trade-distorting 
policies). 
 95. States, of course, are only obligated insofar as they have either become 
party to a treaty by completing the procedures required by the treaty and the 
state’s national law, or where there is a customary international legal 
obligation. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, states 
obligations under multiple treaties must be interpreted in a way that gives 
effect to both wherever possible. See Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, art. 2, para. 1(a), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 96. For a brief, but comprehensive overview of international trade law 
pertaining to agriculture, see Kaufmann and Heri, supra note 5, at 1042–49.  
 97. State behavior is similarly constrained as a result of Structural 
Adjustment Policies (SAPs), which are conditions placed on loans provided by 
IFIs, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). See 
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targets government policies that are trade distorting, but it 
allows governments to offer support where it would not directly 
stimulate production.98 In addition to converting all barriers to 
trade into tariffs (called “tariffication”), countries commit to 
reducing their tariffs over time. However, developing countries 
generally do not have to lower their tariffs as much as 
developed countries,99 and least-developed countries are not 
required to lower their tariffs at all.100  
Subject to strict conditions, governments are allowed to 
take advantage of “special safeguards” to protect their farmers 
from price volatility and “special treatment” provisions to 
protect particularly sensitive products.101 WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy has suggested that countries might take 
advantage of these safeguards to improve food security.102 
However, in reality, these protections are rarely used, either for 
lack of administrative resources in the developing countries,103 
or as a result of prior or existing loan conditionalities from 
IFIs.104 In some cases, it is unclear whether a measure would 
be consistent with existing rules. For example, food stocks—
specifically grain reserves—are being discussed by a number of 
governments as an important component of food security.105 
One study finds that the AoA rules do not necessarily restrict 
countries’ use of grain reserves, but they are not necessarily 
supportive either; in the end, countries will need to test 
 
Narula, supra note 8, at 408. 
 98. Agreement on Agriculture pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 410 (1994) [hereinafter AoA]. The AoA groups types of domestic 
support: the “amber box” includes measures that do affect production and 
must be reduced; the “blue box” includes measures of support that are aimed 
at reducing production, such as income support to farmers; the “green box” 
includes measures that do not directly affect production and can continue, 
such as government research. Id. See also Windfuhr, supra note 15.  
 99. Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2010). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Lamy: Trade and Human Rights Go Hand in Hand, STATE NEWS 
SERVICE (Sept. 30, 2010). 
 103. Hauter, supra note 12, at 1079. 
 104. Downes, supra note 5, at 639.  
 105. Sophia Murphy, Trade and Food Reserves: What Role Does the WTO 
Play?, ECOFAIR TRADE DIALOGUE (Inst. for Agric. & Trade Pol’y, Minneapolis, 
Minn.), Sept. 2010, at 3–4. This policy had been in vogue twenty-plus years 
ago after the food security crisis of the mid-1970’s. See Shelton, supra note 78, 
at 1310–11. 
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them.106  
Therefore, these or other domestic agricultural policies 
may come under attack as being trade distorting or 
protectionist. In the case of an alleged violation, countries 
resort to the dispute settlement mechanism within the WTO. A 
number of scholars have examined how the right to food may be 
used in these arbitrations.  
B. JUDICIAL FORUMS FOR TRADE LAW VIOLATIONS MAY LOOK TO 
RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The main focus of this section is the legal exception in 
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(Article XX) for violations of trade agreements, which may 
prove useful for violations based on the human right to food.107 
The second topic that will be discussed is the potential role of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to aid governments in 
fulfilling their human rights obligations.  
1. The domestic right to food under Article XX jurisprudence 
Recent scholarly attention has been paid to using Article 
XX of the GATT in relation to human rights protections, 
especially the right to food.108 Article XX provides exceptions 
under which a country may disobey its trade mandates for 
important state interests such as “public morals” or human “life 
or health.”109 In general, the WTO Appellate Body’s (AB) 
rulings on Article XX exceptions indicate that any trade-
distortion must be “necessary,” under the language of Article 
XX, to achieve the purposes of one of the enumerated 
exceptions.110 The AB has indicated that it will use a balancing 
test to determine what is “necessary.”111 The AB has applied 
 
 106. Murphy, supra note 105. 
 107. Scholars have posited a range of assessments of the Article XX 
exceptions, which will be discussed below. See, e.g., Downes, supra note 5. 
 108. See Agatha Panday, The Role of International Human Rights Law in 
WTO Dispute Settlement, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 245 (2009) 
(discussing the potential role of Article XX of the GATT to the allowance of 
governments’ human rights goals in WTO adjudications of trade agreement 
violations following the WTO Appellate Body’s decision in U.S.-Shrimp); see 
also Niada, supra note 77, at 191 (briefly discussing Article XX in relation to 
the question of whether WTO obligations and human rights obligations are 
compatible); see also Kaufmann & Heri, supra note 5. 
 109. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX(a)–(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 
61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.S.T. 194. 
 110. See Panday, supra note 108, at 265.  
 111. Christopher Tran, Using GATT, Art XX to Justify Climate Change 
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the balancing test in cases asserting the value of environmental 
protection, but not yet in human rights cases.112 
What is the likelihood, then, that protections based on the 
right to food would qualify under Article XX? It has been 
argued that, due to their protectionist connotation, labor-
related trade measures may not pass the public morals 
exception under XX(a).113 On the one hand, the human right to 
food is a compelling moral basis for enacting a trade measure; 
however, it may not be more compelling than labor standards, 
which are also widely accepted international norms. There is 
also jurisprudential preference for inwardly-directed measures 
(to protect one’s own morals) as compared to outwardly-directed 
measures (which are intended to address another country’s 
moral behavior).114 As the right to food is an inwardly-directed 
concern, this factor would work in the developing country’s 
favor. 
It may be possible to predict the outcome of the balancing 
test between trade-distorting state practices and the relative 
importance of protecting the right to food. One scholar has 
argued that the right to food is not likely to pass muster on this 
basis at present.115 This is based on an assessment of the 
relative likelihood that food security measures would outweigh 
trade obligations in four areas—state trading enterprises, food 
aid, domestic support, and market protection. On the other 
hand, when such food security measures have minimal trade 
distorting effects, they would be more likely to pass the 
equilibrium test.116 This conclusion was reached considering 
only two types of the right to food, both at the international 
level: the right in the ICESCR and international customary 
 
Measures in Claims Under the WTO Agreements, 27 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 346, 
352 (2010) (internal quotations and numbering omitted) (emphasis added). 
 112. Panday, supra note 108. 
 113. Kevin Kolben, The WTO Distraction, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 
479 (2010). 
 114. Id. at 479. 
 115. Downes, supra note 5, at 654. As a general principle, an equilibrium 
analysis would imply that where a measure reflects a ‘strong’ food obligation 
and has a minimal distorting effect on the market, that obligation will 
‘outweigh’ a trade commitment. Where this occurs, the measure, although 
prima facie inconsistent with GATT rules, can be presumed to be legal. 
Equally, where a justification for a GATT-inconsistent measure on the basis of 
the right to food is more tenuous and the impact on international trade is 
considerable, the trade commitment would logically ‘outweigh’ any food 
obligation. Id. at 687. 
 116. Id. at 688–90. 
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law.117 Focusing the inquiry on domestic law might change the 
outcome, considering the relative concreteness and 
enforceability of domestic laws compared to international 
norms. This would allow the weight of the human right to be 
more forceful when balanced against the trade commitment.118 
There are lingering issues related to analyzing the Article 
XX exception. At least in the context of environmental 
protection, it is unclear whether the Article XX approach is 
applicable outside the GATT to other WTO agreements.119 It is 
not safe to assume, then, that new cases relating to AoA would 
be dealt with in a similar manner as prior cases. Additionally, 
there is the problem of precedent, to which the AB is not bound.  
While the exact result remains uncertain, Article XX holds 
promise.120 If good faith policies, upon a legal challenge, were 
shown to fail under Article XX, it would give support to those 
who have called for the removal of food from the authority of 
the WTO.121 A potentially negative consequence of doing so, 
however, is that developing countries risk losing an avenue to 
challenge dumping (i.e. the flooding of a foreign market with 
goods that are priced significantly lower than the domestic 
equivalent)—though critics say that dumping continues with 
the aid of the WTO.122 (Dumping, were it to be addressed in the 
WTO, is also difficult to prove).123 On the other hand, it could 
be argued that the WTO is the best place to address dumping 
because it is uniquely situated to address the problem.124 
 
 117. Id. at 661–78. 
 118. Downes got around this problem by finding the customary right more 
easily weighed against the trade laws. Id. However, even assuming his 
characterization of the customary right to food, a complimentary theory may 
nevertheless be preferable. Cf. Greene, supra note 80. 
 119. See Downes, supra note 5, at 661–78. 
 120. See Panday, supra note 108. Cf. Kolben, supra note 113, at 479 
(arguing that linking trade and labor standards through the WTO is a 
distraction from more productive avenues, such as bilateral and regional 
agreements). This Note may be distinguished on the basis that Kolben was 
arguing from the side of the United States, which has strong labor standards 
and a powerful bargaining position. 
 121. See Downes, supra note 5, at 622. 
 122. Ritchie & Dawkins, supra note 12, at 13–14; Downes, supra note 5, at 
635–36. 
 123. Suppan, supra note 19, at 114. 
 124. Contrarily, the food sovereignty movement calls for an arm of the 
United Nations to regulate food. See Beauregard, supra note 27. However, this 
author is skeptical that human rights experts have the requisite knowledge 
about the economics of international trade. 
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2. The right to food under international BIT arbitration  
The negotiated economic relationship between host states 
and TNCs is a factor limiting host states’ actions.125 Regulation 
of foreign investment occurs through thousands of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs).126 While BITs protect investors, 
they do not directly impose any duties on investors.127 
Specifically, the “stability” clause limits host states’ ability to 
regulate TNCs in a way that could diminish their profits.128 
Yet, while BITs may be viewed as constraints on a 
government’s action,129 they are also mechanisms by which 
governments can assert their citizens’ right to food. 
BITs are interpreted through a decentralized process of 
international arbitration130 in tribunals with limited 
jurisdiction over a particular BIT.131 Theoretically, however, 
international law generally may be relevant to the resolution of 
disputes under Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention, and 
many courts have agreed with such an assessment.132 
Arbitrators have, to date, referenced human rights law only 
where human rights—such as due process and property—can 
be used to protect businesses involved in foreign investment.133  
Increasingly, however, host states—the country on whose 
soil the company is operating—are raising their obligations to 
their citizens, as non-parties to the BITs, to counter investors’ 
claims against the host state for violating legal protections 
owed to them.134 Though the right to food specifically has not 
been raised in arbitration, counterclaims for an abuse of the 
 
 125. Narula, supra note 8, at 416. 
 126. LUKE ERIC PETERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS & BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 11 (Rights & Democracy 2009), available at http://www.dd-
rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/HIRA-volume3-ENG.pdf. 
 127. Id. at 12. Forms of protection include repatriation of profits; treatment 
of foreign business on the same plane as national treatment or most-favored 
nation treatment; “fair and equitable treatment” or “full protection and 
security”; and promise of full compensation in case of nationalization. See id. 
at 13, tbl.1.  
 128. Id. at 410 (citing Olivier de Schutter, Transnational Corporations as 
Instruments of Human Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: 
TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 414–16 (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson 
eds., 2005)). 
 129. Narula, supra note 8, at 408. 
 130. Peterson, supra note 126. 
 131. Id. at 22. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 9, 23, 25. 
 134. Id. at 910. 
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human right to water as established in the CESCR have been 
brought by states against investors in disputes over 
investments in the water and sanitation sector.135 Argentina 
has been the strongest proponent of using this approach.136  
As with Article XX above, there are a number of lingering 
concerns. First, there is no precedential requirement upon 
arbitrators, and arbitration proceedings need not be public.137 
Also, nations may feel too vulnerable pursuing these actions 
alone, and therefore a multilateral agreement on investment 
may be needed.138 
An alternative would be for a country to establish a rule in 
its BIT that the country would exert jurisdiction over the 
foreign corporation if an individual were to challenge the TNC 
directly for a human rights violation.139 A BIT can contain a 
provision “for the enforcement of judgments in the host country 
against TNC’s in the home country.”140 It may also include a 
provision that tort claims may be brought against a company in 
its home country, i.e. an “expanded aliens tort provision.”141 
Finally, courts could incorporate a version of the balancing test 
to give deference to policies made for the protection of human 
rights.142  
C. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS 
Another tool is international cooperation, which could be 
used to extend competition law to TNCs or to demand 
beneficial treatment for the purchase of seeds. The next section 
will discuss a proposal for special treatment of seeds under the 
WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
 135. Id. at 26–27. 
 136. Id. at 27. Argentina has used the human right to water to argue for a 
favorable interpretation of the expropriation and equitable treatment clause 
and the definition of “necessity” for violations. See id. at 27–29. 
 137. Yira Segrera Alaya, Restoring the Balance in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: Incorporating Human Rights Clauses, Revista de Derecho, Núm. 32 
(Universidad del Norte Colombia), 144–45, Dec. 2009, available at 
http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/851/85112936007.pdf.  
 138. Id. at 159. 
 139. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards 
Principles of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing 
Rights with Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 537 (2007) 
(discussing the role of Bilateral Investment Treaties and debunking myths of 
market fundamentalism).  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 538. 
 142. See id. at 546. 
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(TRIPS) Agreement.  
1. Cooperation to reach special agreement on seeds 
The privatization of seeds—a component of agricultural 
liberalization—negatively affects food security by causing 
economic and physical dependence on the genetically modified 
(GM) seed stock and encouraging production of food for export 
rather than local consumption.143 Worse, seed companies have 
been accused of expropriating traditional knowledge, and then 
selling it back to farmers at high prices (e.g., Bt cotton).144 
These companies are heavily concentrated, as will be discussed 
below.  
One potential solution might be to encourage reform of the 
WTO system to include an exception for low-cost agricultural 
inputs that are essential to the right to food, including seeds 
and fertilizers. There may already be a mechanism in place in 
TRIPS that can be used to patent seeds specially for developed 
countries: a unique system of patenting to protect seed 
producers and farmers.145 However, it deserves a note of 
caution that some regional trade agreements may be more 
restrictive than the WTO and TRIPS.146 
One scholar has suggested such a plan for distribution of 
GM seeds to combat hunger, called the “GM Seeds for Africa” 
plan, as a bottom-up approach to food security.147 GM seeds 
could help combat food insecurity because they have higher 
yields and nutritional benefits than non-GM seeds.148 While 
seeds of the Green Revolution required higher levels of 
expensive inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides, GM seeds 
now require fewer costly inputs.149 The “GM Seeds for Africa” 
plan would involve an agreement between developing states 
and agribusiness to purchase GM seeds at a reduced cost,150 
 
 143. Id. at 196–200. 
 144. Suppan, supra note 19, at 116. 
 145. See Peter Straub, supra note 74, at 206–07 (suggesting an exploration 
of the sui generis system that was provided for under TRIPS). 
 146. Emily M. Cowley, The Right to Health: Guatemala’s Conflicting 
Obligations Under the Central American Free Trade Agreement and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 11 MICH. 
ST. J. MED. & L. 240 (2007). 
 147. Franke Tenente, Feeding the World One Seed at a Time: A Practical 
Alternative for Solving World Hunger, 5 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 298 (2007). 
 148. Id. at 311. 
 149. Id. at 317. 
 150. Id. at 318. 
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which might be modeled on the deal brokered by the UN for the 
reformed TRIPS agreement.151  
That deal followed the signing of TRIPS, and was a 
response to the outcry over the high cost of life-saving 
HIV/AIDS medicines and called for pharmaceutical companies 
to provide low cost medicines and allow companies to produce 
generic AIDS drugs for African countries.152 There is a parallel 
issue of compatibility between a country’s obligation to protect 
the health of its citizens and its obligation to protect IP rights 
for pharmaceutical companies under TRIPS or other free trade 
agreements.153 The most direct such link is the connection 
between IP rights and patents placed on GM or genetically 
engineered (GE) seeds.154  
While this Note doesn’t necessarily align with this 
suggestion,155 it is mentioned here to indicate that the 
availably of GM seeds at a low cost might be a step toward 
achieving the right to food, and it could be seen as an argument 
against encouraging strict intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
for seed developers. On the other hand, if food security isn’t a 
result of the total global supply of food, but instead of people’s 
 
 151. Id. at 320. 
 152. Tenente, supra note 147, at 320.  
 153. For a country-specific discussion, see Cowley, supra note 146, at 227 
(concluding that Guatemala, in order to fulfill its human rights obligations, 
should seek revision of Article 15 of the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) to make it more compatible with the human right to 
health or, if unsuccessful in that attempt, should unilaterally withdraw from 
CAFTA). 
 154. Straub, supra note 74, at 212 (“[D]eveloping states find themselves 
under external and internal pressure to enact stricter norms of IP 
protection.”). 
 155. For a detailed survey of the debate over GM seeds, see Hossein Azadi 
& Peter Ho, Genetically Modified and Organic Crops in Developing Countries: 
A Review of Options for Food Security, 28 BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 160 
(2010), http://www.globalchange.umich.edu/globalchange2/current/labs/gmfood
_video/GM%20review%202010.pdf (concluding that GM adoption, where it 
occurs, should be done in a manner that minimizes its potential risks). 
Potential risks of GM adoption include a lower quality of food; antibiotic 
resistance; toxicity; allergenicity; gene transfer to wild plants; new viruses and 
toxins; limited access because of patents; religious, cultural and ethical 
concerns; labeling concerns; animal rights concerns; negative effects on 
organic and traditional farmers; unknown impacts and wider ecosystem and 
environmental concerns. Id at 162, Table 1. A higher yield, lower cost, and 
lower requirement of inputs such as water are the supposed benefits of GM 
seeds as compared to organic agriculture which has advantages for human 
health, food quality and nutrition, plant biodiversity and disease-rates, 
cultural biodiversity and jobs, natural resources, costs, and animal health and 
welfare. Id. at 163, tbl.2. 
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access to food,156 increasing the total global yield is likely to be 
a misdirected goal.  
2. Cooperation in the application of national competition law 
The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur for Food, 
Oliver De Schutter, has suggested a number of national actions 
that support the right to food,157 including the application of 
local competition laws to TNCs.158 It is generally accepted that 
competition leads to net gains in efficiency.159 This policy might 
prevent companies from increasing the prices on inputs and 
exerting downward pressure on the prices of goods produced.160  
There is strong evidence that the concentration in 
agricultural markets of a small group of corporate actors161 
negatively affects the bargaining position of farmers.162 This so-
called market power in agriculture occurs both in the sale of 
productive resources, such as seeds,163 and in the purchase of 
 
 156. See FAQs on Hunger, supra note 7 (“The majority of the people who 
don’t have enough to eat live in poor, rural communities in developing 
countries.”). 
 157. See De Schutter, supra note 29.  
 158. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Agribusiness and the Right to Food, ¶¶ 34–6, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/33 (Dec. 22, 2009) (by Olivier De Schutter), available at 
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20100305_a-hrc-13-33-
agribusiness_en.pdf. 
 159. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 17, at 31 (“In a perfect market, open 
competition among firms ensures that consumers are given as much of and as 
good a product as it is possible to make at the price they are willing to pay.”). 
 160. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 24. The result of market power is the 
“cost-price squeeze,” which means the result of increasing costs of inputs such 
as seeds and fertilizers and the decreasing margin of return. Id. 
 161. See Spieldoch, supra note 12 (“U.S. agribusiness also controls a large 
percentage of global trade and investment in food and agriculture; hence, our 
domestic regulations matter a great deal internationally. The U.S. is the 
largest global producer of both chicken and cattle meat and the second-largest 
pork producer. Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and Bunge control 
most of the corn, soy and wheat being moved around the world. Monsanto 
accounts for nearly 90 percent of the global market in genetically engineered 
seeds. ADM employs 28,000 people in more than 60 countries and is invested 
in oilseeds, corn, food and feed ingredients, sweeteners, biofuels and agri-
cultural services. Cargill is even larger, employing 159,000 people in 68 coun-
tries and is invested in meat, grains and poultry, fuels, fertilizer, sweeteners 
and starches, grain trading markets and agricultural services.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 162. For a general overview on concentration of market power in 
agriculture, see Murphy, supra note 17. 
 163. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is looking at the 
concentrated market power of Monsanto and seed companies. In its report, the 
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farm commodities.164 Market power allows firms to set 
standards on products for export that can be prohibitive for 
many farmers.165 Competition laws would ideally improve 
farmers’ bargaining position with respect to prices, wages, and 
the types of standards that the producers must comply with 
(and often cannot).166  
There are conceptual and practical difficulties faced by any 
host country that seeks to regulate the market power of TNCs 
in order to protect its citizens’ right to food. 167 One major 
challenge is that some governments are unwilling to 
regulate.168 Because the investments are often critical to the 
developing economy’s economy, countries compete to attract 
investors by most lowering their regulations, called a “race to 
the bottom.”169 There is also the problem of resources and 
expertise, both of which are lacking in developing countries.170 
 
CGIAR, which has a mission to achieve sustainable food security and reduce 
poverty in developing countries, urged the DOJ and the USDA to take into 
account the affect that United States seed companies have on developing 
country markets: “Certain practices in the U.S. seed industry, resulting in the 
concentration of ownership of IP or vertical integration of seed production, can 
translate into undesirable effects outside the U.S. such as restricted choice of 
lines of high quality seeds, lack of access to germplasm for breeding, and lack 
of control over price.” CGIAR Central Advisory Service on Intellectual 
Property, Comments Regarding Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement Issues 
in Our 21st Century Economy, http://www.slideshare.net/CAS.IP/comments-
regarding-agriculture-and-antitrust-enforcement-isues-in-our-21st (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
 164. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 5–6. 
 165. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 14 (citing the example of on-farm 
refrigeration for dairy farmers in Brazil). 
 166. The focus of this Note is only on competition regulation, not 
environment, workers rights, or other regulatory fields. For a brief discussion 
framing the issue of agribusiness and competition law, see Timothy A. Wise, 
Ask an Economist: Regulating Multinational Agribusiness, TRIPLECRISIS, 
http://triplecrisis.com/ask-an-economist-regulating-multinational-agribusiness
/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
 167. This can be seen to violate the non-discrimination principle of free 
trade. However, as Joseph Stiglitz has indicated, a distinction can be drawn 
between direct discrimination against a foreign corporation or investor, i.e. 
discrimination was the primary purpose of the regulation, and discrimination 
in effect, i.e. there is a legitimate public purpose. See Stiglitz, supra note 139, 
at 549. 
 168. See Graham & Woods, supra note 83, at 869 (“Some governments are 
unwilling to regulate, perceiving instead benefits to be gained from a lack of 
regulation as they compete for foreign direct investment.”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Pradeep Mehta, Living with Cross-Border Competition Challenges in 
the Absence of Global Competition Rules, CENTRE ON REGULATION AND 
COMPETITION, 7 (2003), http://www.competition-regulation.org.uk/conferences/
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Market power may be more difficult to identify than monopoly 
power.171 This may not always be a problem, especially for 
larger developing economies. China recently adopted an anti-
trust law,172 which might serve as a model for a similarly 
situated country such as Brazil.173 
There are obvious jurisdictional problems with the 
application of such laws, given that the foreign agribusinesses 
with market power are largely organized under the laws of non-
obligated countries.174 For example, the United States has not 
been unilaterally opposed to extraterritorial enforcement of its 
laws when it benefits American companies. In fact, it has 
enforced its antitrust laws extraterritorially against 
monopolistic actions by other states.175 However, these states 
have not attempted to enforce their own competition laws 
extraterritorially against United States firms.176 While the 
United States has settled on the “effects” test to determine the 
reach of its anti-trust enforcement, this test for jurisdiction has 
not been easily accepted by other countries.177 In some cases, 
bilateral agreements and cooperation178 can settle the matter of 
 
Philippines03/Mehta.pdf. 
 171. See id. at 9 (“[E]ach competition authority has to conduct its own 
investigation to detect and prove the violation of the relevant laws and 
calculate the extent of damage. Resource constrained small economies will not 
be able to do this alone.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Xiaoye Wang, Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law, 
75 ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (2008).  
 173. For an in-depth comparison of the agricultural sector in Brazil and 
China, see Mario Queiroz de Monteiro Jales et al., Agriculture and Brazil and 
China: Challenges and Opportunities, INTAL-ITD (October 2006), 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35317353. 
 174. For example, the United States is not a party to any legally binding 
international agreement concerning the right to food. How customary 
international law might affect the obligations of the United States will be 
discussed below. There has been helpful scholarship written on the 
extraterritorial enforcement of the right to food that makes doctrinal 
recommendations. See, e.g., Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors 
Accountable Under International Law, supra note 68. 
 175. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 
188 (2000). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See, e.g., Paul Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits 
of International Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 173, 203 (2005); Mehta, 
supra note 170, at 7 (“The wide-ranging nature of this concept aroused 
considerable opposition outside the US, as did American attempts to take 
evidence abroad under very broad pre-trial discovery provisions in US law.”). 
 178. Mehta, supra note 170, at 8. 
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jurisdiction.179  
One potential solution to these problems is competition law 
cooperation between countries.180 Implicit in the idea of an 
international competition law is a sense of universal norms and 
values.181 However, while accepted as a topic for debate in the 
Doha round of WTO negotiations, developing states have been 
hesitant to enter into multilateral competition agreements.182 
Discussion of competition issues at the Doha round of 
negotiations was blocked by civil society organizations because 
of the perception that the United States and the EU were 
interested in advancing the position of their firms, not in 
eliminating threats to competition.183 Like competition law, 
multilateral agreements on investment have also failed in the 
face of suspicious civil society.184 It has been suggested instead 
that the regional approach of CARICOM (Caribbean 
Community) may be a model for other countries.185  
Also, a less centralized form of international cooperation 
may be possible. The International Competition Network (ICN) 
is a transnational regulatory network of over one hundred 
competition agencies that is committed to promoting antitrust 
enforcement through enhanced cooperation and convergence of 
principles. 186 Together with merger review and cartel work, 
the ICN also targets anti-competitive unilateral conduct of 
dominant firms and firms with market power by creating 
 
 179. See Stephan, supra note 177, at 204–05 (“In the case of antitrust, 
however, some intergovernmental agreements also seek to distribute 
regulatory jurisdiction.”). 
 180. Id. It deserves mention that competition law is not a uniform 
enterprise among nations; varying approaches result from logistical 
differences as much as political-economic interests such as protectionism. See 
id. at 178–95. 
 181. Id. at 196. 
 182. See Mehta, supra note 170, at 8. Similarly, in 1995, a block of 
developing countries declared its opposition to inserting a social clause or any 
labor-related provision into trade agreements, calling it “coercive.” Kolben, 
supra note 113, at 469. These countries deemed such efforts veiled 
protectionism. Id. at 470. 
 183. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 33. 
 184. See Peterson, supra note 126, at 11. 
 185. Mehta, supra note 170, at 7. Examples of regional approaches also 
include those in Mercosur, COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa), SADC (Southern African Development Community), EAC 
(East African Community), CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of 
Central Africa). Id. at 9. 
 186. See ICN Factsheet and Key Messages (April 2009), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc608.pdf. 
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recommended regulatory practices and reports and holding 
workshops.187 Other global competition initiatives such as 
UNCTAD and the OECD’s Global Forum similarly set 
standards, provide technical assistance, and share 
information.188 This may solve the problem of scarce 
administrative resources. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The question that this Note set out to address is whether 
or not developing states that are obligated protect the right to 
food of their citizens can legally act in that regard, given their 
existing trade commitments. Its conclusion, based on a 
thorough examination of the literature in this field, is that 
countries that are committed to the human right to food can act 
more assertively with regard to protectionist trade policies and 
in the regulation of TNCs, and they can do so both alone and 
cooperatively.  
Instead of focusing on developed countries such as the 
United States, this Note focused on developing countries that 
have implemented the right to food and provided actors within 
those countries with a legally-sound framework in which to 
pursue their goals. This should not be taken as an assertion 
that the United States should not act to promote respect for 
human rights at the national or international level, but rather 
as a complimentary view that developing countries should 
continue to implement the right to food domestically. 
 
 
 187. See id. 
 188. See Mehta, supra note 170, at 9–11.  
